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By raising fundamental questions about the methods and ultimate goals of European integration,
Maastricht forced supporters and opponents alike to confront the legitimacy both of the Union and - as
has become apparent with the crisis of the Santer Commission -  of the institutional architecture put in
place to steer it.
2  The strategic-oriented action and normative argument avoided for so long by the main
political actors, are inescapable when tackling this issue. Thus, national politicians and European
authorities have self-consciously, though perhaps confusedly, been obliged to start discussing  the future
shape of what Jacques Delors once called ‘un object politique non-identifié.’ Academics, for their part,
have discovered that the integration process depends not simply on functional efficiency and certain
given economic and national interests,
3 but also on people’s ideals and perceptions. Consequently,
explanation and justification have proved less easily distinguishable than earlier positivistic and
behaviouralist models assumed. Hence, the ‘normative turn’ in European studies.
4
In this essay we wish to clarify certain aspects of the normative turn (section 1) and to explore
some of the substantive issues that emerge from subjecting the European integration process to normative
scrutiny (sections 2, 3 and 4). In the conclusion, we shall sketch the kind of normative politics we feel
best suits the emerging European polity.
5
Normative Arguments
Only when the intellectual history of European integration has been written, shall we know how far
academic views and prejudices have shaped the perceptions of the main political actors. Part of this
influence is filtered through artificial disciplinary distinctions that are as inevitable, given the complex
organisation of the production and transmission of knowledge in modern societies, as they are often
confusing. Though talk of a normative turn reflects a partial break-up of traditional subject boundaries
within the social sciences, some clarifications are in order to avoid misunderstandings arising from
different disciplinary discourses.
Within international relations -  one of the fundamental discourses shaping integration theory -
normativism was for a long time synonymous with idealism.
6  As such, it was opposed to realism, which
became the dominant view as the post-First-World-War order started to collapse. A similar opposition
between normativism and realism, both articulated within a positivistic idiom, was played out more or
less at the same time in theories of international and constitutional law by authors such as Kelsen and
Schmitt respectively. Functionalism and later, in the post-war period, neo-functionalism, added the
growing interconnectedness of the international economy and the states-system to this picture. But this
perspective reduced the scope for politics, as informed and strategically-oriented action, even more by
subordinating it to the broader effects of spill-over, task-oriented, functional and imitative processes.
The rise of normative theory in European integration studies largely reflects the discovery that
politics, in both its strategic and legitimating senses, matters. The normative turn to which we and other
commentators refer,
7 however, does not imply a return to idealism. It does not mean simply giving norms
or grand ideals their due as political motives to counterbalance their underplaying or neglect by realism,
intergovernmentalism and functionalism. The normative turn suggests these latter scenarios also have a
normative dimension, since they draw on a broadly utilitarian ethic. In certain historical circumstances,Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1530444 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1530444
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moreover, the quest for political legitimacy requires a shift to a more intentionalist paradigm. In these
cases, we need reasoned arguments and justifications for the direction we wish to take and the methods
we propose employing. Whether reason and ideals, by themselves, motivate people, is a different
question. The normative turn, therefore, is not solely or necessarily an attempt to idealise political and
social processes. It is principally, and need only be, an evaluation of different scenarios of the integration
process in the light of normative criteria. Normative acceptability of this external kind does not turn on
any internal identification with the EU’s ideals on the part of those involved, even if the two aspects are
more linked than functionalist and realist accounts have hitherto acknowledged.
This reading of the normative turn may appear odd in view of two other developments in
European studies. One is the recognition that European integration needs to be understood within a more
global process of supra- and infra-national governance. The other is the conviction that the
constitutionalization of the European Union and its Communities has deposed the traditional concept of
state sovereignty from its central place. If anything, both developments would seem to reinforce some of
the intuitions of early functionalists, while placing the emphasis less on the politics of interests and
strategies, and more on the systemic character of the integration and constitutionalization processes.
8
Governance discourse claims to capture the growing complexity of contemporary  decision
making, characterised as it is by polycentrism, fragmentation and a multiplication of institutions that cut
across more hierarchical structures of power. The first message of governance - it has been argued - is to
challenge constitutional and formal understandings of governmental systems,
9 so that the complex
architecture of globalized and fragmented decision making is set free from the normative codes
traditionally associated with a more personalised conception of government. This thesis contains much
truth. Though some theories of global governance are overstated, the general thrust of recent
developments probably points in this direction.
10 However, that something is occurring does not make it
automatically a good thing. Even if these developments are inevitable, that merely makes them the
background conditions to be taken into account by any plausible form of legitimate governance. For
unless one dismisses issues of legitimacy altogether, then those who are convinced that global and trans-
national governance has become a fact of life (or is it a new version of the forward march of history?)
still need to come up with new kinds of legitimacy appropriate to these circumstances. Hence normative
arguments acquire greater relevance and centrality rather than less, since at stake is the justification of
different socio-political arrangements.
Similar points arise in the welcome application of constitutional law thinking to the European
Union.
11 The application of legal models to the EU has proved as contested as the alleged shift from
government to governance, since many jurists maintain only a state can properly possess its own law and
constitutional norms. The main disagreement lies between those who still consider the Union the product
of simple treaties in international law, and those who see it as having a constitutional order ex proprio
vigore.
12  Even more than the governance debate, this dispute turns on how the agents are conceived.
Whether the Union is an international organisation or a form of polity is neither a fact of nature nor
determined independently of the intentions of the agents involved. It could be maintained that socio-legal
relations are as autonomous from the control of individuals and collectivities as socio-political forces and
developments are. If - the argument runs - a regular pattern of socio-legal relations develops between
different states and their respective populations similar to that characterising a political community, this
would automatically give rise to a new political entity, regardless of peoples’ perceptions. However, in
spite of an important cumulative effect that may escape human control, socio-legal relations are more
directly determined by peoples’ choices than socio-political relations normally are. Nor does the standard
version of the unintended consequences argument apply to legal, as it may to economic, relationships.
Without seeking to settle the more philosophical dispute over the instrumental versus the systemic nature
of legal orders, it can be argued that an important element of collective self-perception is involved in the
shift from an inter-state system to a political community, and that each may involve different theoretical
languages. This difference is often characterised in terms of the theory of international law and politics,
which seeks to control external risks and uncertainties, and hence consists in a theory of survival, on the3
one hand; and a theory of law and politics in its proper sense, which aims at establishing human control
over social life, and is therefore based on a theory of the good life, on the other.
13 The crucial change
when shifting from the international to the community language - whether one qualifies this in
communitarian or cosmopolitan terms - lies in the sense of collective identity that is acquired in the
passage. There is no avoiding subjective perceptions in the latter.
Within this context, the return of constitutional thinking to the forefront of European integration
discourse is part and parcel of the normative turn. This gives a different twist to constitutional discourse,
which is no longer seen in its mainly positive and doctrinal aspects, nor as the mere description of a
system of government; but involves the broader meaning of ‘constitution’ as both the construction and
socio-political composition of European civic society. At this stage of the integration process, the main
issue lies in what Francis Snyder has described as the passage from the existence of a European
constitution in the substantive sense (the totality of norms making up the legal order of a polity)
14 to a
constitution in the subjective sense (implying the recognition of the subjective orientation of the people
towards the substantive constitution itself).
15 As Snyder says, ‘dealing with the issues raised by this
perspective is one of the principal tasks for EU policy-makers in the next decade. Simultaneously it is a
major challenge to EU constitutional law scholarship.’
16 The fundamental issues involved here are the
relationship between the constitutional order and society as a whole; that of authorisation (the nature and
forms of the constituent power); and that of legitimacy in both a social (acceptance and consent) and
normative sense (underlying values; recognition of interests, opinions and identities).
17
Considering the issues raised by both the governance and the constitutional perspectives, the
main task currently facing Europe is  how ‘to organise relations of [legitimate] authority in a non-
hierarchical and polycentric polity.’
18 Here we come to the final clarification of the nature of the
normative turn. We have associated this turn in academic interest to the return of grand politics in
Europe.
19 This is similar to what Daniel Wincott in this same volume refers to as the political projects
around the European Union.
20 Naturally, such projects are suffused with the kind of normative arguments
that are central to the normative turn. But the way in which normative arguments enter into the political
projects is not necessarily the same as the way the academic literature looks at them. Of course, academic
texts are also political acts in the sense the contextualist revolution in the history of political thought has
long maintained.
21 As argued in relation to the constitutional nature of the Union, looking at it from a
particular perspective is also to make a political statement.
22 However, there are three crucial differences
that need to be noted. First there is a difference of style and intention. The academic literature can afford
to be less prescriptive and hortatory in its formulations. This also implies that it is easier for it to take a
more detached and anthropological view of the integration process by re-describing it in terms that may
differ from those employed by the participants themselves.
23 Secondly, the academic approach to
normative questions is less open to the contingencies of political action and strategies, which instead play
an integral part in articulating a political project. In this sense, political practice is more open-ended and
therefore creative in dealing with normative dilemmas (something that may give rise to unexpected goods
as well as bads).
24 Thirdly, and perhaps in this context the more important difference, the normative
perspective is a second-order discourse, some would call it a meta-discourse,
25 within the academic
literature. It does not simply use value-laden arguments or try to apply them, but also enquires into the
strength of conviction that normative arguments carry with them, and their internal coherence and
external feasibility. This is what really distinguishes appeals to norms, as done in first-order political
literature, from the exploration of the reasons underlying norms, which is what the literature on the
normative turn is supposed to contribute to European studies.
Legitimacy and the Three European Deficits
As we  suggested at the beginning, the new focus produced by the normative turn is on the legitimacy of
ends and means. Up to Maastricht, question begging was an intrinsic part of the principal integration
strategy. According to the so-called Monnet or Community method, Europe was to be made in the details
through administrative means and elite bargaining. Legal rules and democratic decision making merely4
offered ex-post endorsements of an already existing reality. This method had the advantage of allowing a
federal structure to be formed by stealth, while keeping nation states in control of the overall direction of
the process. As a result, it pleased both federalists and intergovernmentalists, and has proved compatible
with analyses from each of these perspectives. Political debate and directly consensual forms of
legitimation were eschewed as either irrelevant to technical matters or inappropriate for inter-state
bargaining. Moreover, discussion of the ultimate shape and scope of the EU was carefully avoided.
26 The
project possessed the social legitimacy offered by good economic performance and responsiveness to
demands from infra-national groups and organisations (or European civil society at large), and the formal
legitimacy provided by the international law framework (pacta servanda sunt) within which the various
Treatises were agreed. But its political legitimacy was the indirect and weak result of the negotiations
having been carried out by elected national politicians and their civil servants.
Recently, however, social and legal legitimacy have become more problematic, and the need for
direct political legitimacy correspondingly greater.
27 In the immediate post-war period, peace and
prosperity were seen as obvious public goods that required co-ordinated European action to be
achieved.
28 The end of the cold war and a slowing up of fifty years of steady growth have changed that
perception. What is required to secure these basic goods is now more disputed. Many analysts contend
peace depends on states simply being liberal democracies rather than on their joining together into a
single unit. Likewise, global markets certainly necessitate inter-state co-operation to establish free trade
and regulate them, but how much beyond that is less clear. The old social democratic consensus on such
matters has come increasingly under attack from the new right and the experiments with privatisation
adopted in almost all the member states since the 1980s. The Common Agricultural Policy, for example,
is likely to prove ever more contentious, as are the degree and character of regulations in areas such as
health and safety and the environment which impose direct costs and produce only diffuse and indirect
benefits. As friction over issues such as fishing rights reveal, nation states are not averse to defecting
from collective arrangements whenever it seems in their short-term interest to do so and free-riding on
the efforts of others. The proliferation of opt outs over matters such as the Euro testify to increasing
disagreement over what economic and social policies are in the common interest. Meanwhile, expansion
to the East and attempts to extend the public goods supplied by the EU are liable to heighten these
tensions by raising the costs and decreasing the benefits available to existing members.
The formal legitimacy offered by law has been unable to make up for the lessening of the EU’s
social legitimacy. Indeed, in some respects the dramatic growth in legal integration may have exacerbated
the situation. Even those scholars who believe the member states still control the overall process accept
that the gradual constitutionalization of the Treaties through successive judgements of the ECJ and
Intergovernmental Conferences means some form of supranational constitution is in the making,
requiring a reconsideration of the methods, aims and principal agents of integration.
29 However, this
extension of legal integration has often appeared to overstep not only what seems socially and
economically warranted, but also the substantive values and express wishes of the populations of the
member states. This conflict has been particularly evident in the clashes between the ECJ and national
constitutional courts in cases such as Grogan, where the ECJ’s defence of the EC’s core principles, the
four market freedoms, have been opposed to an even higher law emanating from the national Demos of
the member state involved.
30 A similar concern lay behind the German Federal Constitutional Court’s
Brunner ruling
31 and the uneasy ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by the British parliament and by
referenda in Denmark and France. In these situations, the formal legality of the ECJ’s judgements proves
no substitute for its lack of substantial legitimacy.
32 The Court’s increasing willingness to refer to notions
of rights that strictly speaking lie outside the domain of European law indicate the dilemma it now finds
itself in.
33 However, since these rights can be subject to incommensurable interpretations by different
national jurisdictions, this manoeuvre does not circumvent the possibility of conflict but merely moves it
to a more fundamental level.
34 One prominent legal commentator has even likened the potential stand off
between the ECJ and national constitutional courts to the Cold War policy of Mutual Armed
Destruction.
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As already suggested, the retreat of the Community method and its associated political strategies
and forms of legitimation has produced a shift to an intentionalist paradigm that relies on more direct
forms of consensual legitimacy.
36 For the exhaustion of the EU’s social and formal legitimacy can be
remedied only through an explicit political commitment to a particular form of Union. As a result,
academic attention has focused on the EU’s democratic deficit with a renewed urgency. This is often
seen as a question of the poor accountability of rulers to the ruled within the complex structure of the
EU. Analysts note how European issues are rarely decisive in national elections, thereby undermining
claims that decisions by the Council of Ministers or at Intergovernmental Conferences have the implicit
approval of the various domestic electorates of the politicians involved. They also lament the weakness
of the European Parliament and the general obscurity of the EC’s decision-making processes -
particularly the shady dealings of comitology - and the resulting largely unassailable position of the
Commission. Because it upholds directives that are sometimes viewed as imposed rather than
democratically enacted, and employs legal reasoning that can be perceived as alien, the European Court
of Justice’s standing has also come to be questioned.
Whilst Europhobes suggest this anomalous situation calls for a drastic reduction of the EU’s
powers, most pro-Europeans advocate normalising its arrangements by making it more like a liberal
democratic state. For them, the remedy lies in strengthening the Parliament’s role as the main
representative institution within the context of an increasingly federal European political system
possessing a written European constitution and a central constitutional court. This argument begs several
important questions, however, as a number of politicians and academics have increasingly come to
realise. Why democratic accountability at the European level matters, and to whom, largely go
unexplored in this proposal. To assert that most Europeans value democracy and the rule of law, though
no doubt true, does not get us very far. One cannot assume that they either want it for the same reasons,
or wish to exercise it together. There are various forms of democratic rule entailing different kinds of
constitutional settlement, and a range of European constituencies and peoples who might wish to employ
them for diverse and not always compatible purposes. Which democracy is appropriate and when turns to
a large degree on who wishes to participate and what it is supposed to achieve.
These questions reveal three dimensions to the EU’s democratic deficit, two of which are rarely
addressed. First, there is the democratic deficit in the narrow sense of the relative absence of any
influence by ordinary citizens over European decision-makers and the policies they enact in their name.
Second, there is the federal deficit. This arises from the ambiguous relationship between the central EU
institutions, such as the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament and the Commission, on the
one hand, which claim a federal status within their respective domains, and national parliaments, courts
and bureaucracies, on the other, which frequently dispute or seek to qualify such claims. Finally, there is
the constitutional deficit. This refers to the lack of any systematic normative and popular legitimation of
European political institutions due to the paucity of sustained debate about their overall shape and reach -
even by the political and bureaucratic élite. If the first deficit focuses on democratic accountability and
representation, the second raises the issue of the distribution of sovereignty, and the third the problem of
the EU’s legitimacy. The three are interrelated. How one tackles the first of these deficits will largely be
framed by one’s thinking on the broader issues raised by the second and third. For the type and degree of
democracy suitable for everyday political decisions rests to a great extent on the ways sovereignty is
parcelled out and the degree to which it is regarded as legitimate for a given body to make them. These
dimensions define the scope, content and sphere of democracy - who makes decisions about whom, why,
when and where .
The standard Europhile view of the democratic deficit, rehearsed above, ignores the issues raised
by the federal and constitutional aspects of the problem. It simply assumes a straightforwardly federal
organisation of power and the popular and substantive legitimacy of a European polity. These
assumptions are contentious on both normative and empirical grounds, however, and create an easy target
for those Europhobes who wish to question the European project tout court. To meet such objections, it is
necessary to offer an account of the constitutional and democratic structure of the Union that is as6
complex and open as the various social and political forces driving the process of integration. We shall
try to do this in the next section by discussing the constitutional and federal deficits (with particular
attention to issues of identity and sovereignty), whilst in the following one we shall turn to the
democratic deficit more narrowly understood.
Sovereignty and Identity
Commentators appear to have reached a ‘negative’ agreement on the sui generis nature of the EU’s
constitutional structure. The novelty of the EU perplexes, attracts and repels in equal measure. The EU
and the various European Communities are supranational organisations established in a piecemeal way
by international treaties that have taken on a life of their own. What disconcerts observers the most is that
the EU possesses so many of the features of a state without its actually being one. On the one hand, the
EU controls various spheres that traditionally have been associated with states - regulating much public
and private behaviour, allocating and generating revenue, and concluding international agreements on
certain trade and security matters - and has many statist characteristics, such as its own bureaucratic,
judicial and political systems. On the other hand, it cannot be classified as a sovereign constitutional
nation state in the manner of its constituent members. The defining attributes of a congruence of territory,
functional authority and national identity; a monopoly of legitimate violence within its borders; exclusive
control over the movement of goods and persons within its domain; a clear locus and hierarchy of power
and offices; and pre-set limits to its area of competence - all these are absent. In spite of having a Court,
an Executive and a Parliament, there is no real separation of powers, and the democratic and legal checks
that do exist are far weaker than those Europeans take for granted in their own polities.
A full diagnosis of what we have described in the previous section as the EU’s current political
legitimation crisis requires some understanding of these perplexing features. This implies two
interrelated tasks that EU scholars have too often kept distinct. The first involves analysing the nature of
the emerging European polity, the second exploring what type of regime or system of governance is best
suited to enabling the EU deliver the democratic goods on which political legitimacy rests. Integration
theorists have tended to concentrate on the polity formation aspect of the question and democratic
theorists on the regime aspect. However, theories of political integration that do not address its
democratic character are normatively blind and lack a sense of where they ought to be headed, whilst
democratic theories that are formulated in ignorance of the political shape of the EU prove empirically
empty and so unable to make the democratic ideal a reality. Rendering the EU politically legitimate
entails seeing how these two dimensions might mutually influence each other, with the character of the
EU polity shaping the form the democratic regime takes and being in its turn shaped by democratic
decision making.
The distinction between polity and regime
37 reveals two dimensions to political legitimacy. The
polity dimension concerns the legitimacy of the political community as a bounded entity wishing to
determine its affairs. This is largely a question of political identity, and democratic theory per se cannot
resolve it, since democracy presupposes a relatively autonomous group amongst whom its decisions are
binding.
38 In the modern world, nation states have come to represent the natural locus of political
decision making, sanctioned internally by their monopoly over the legitimate use of force and externally
by a system of international law based on state sovereignty. Throughout the past two hundred years,
claims to political autonomy and self-determination have been couched in terms of either nationhood or
statehood, therefore, with the one very often meant to imply the other. As suggested by the description of
the perplexing features of the EU, recent developments towards global governance have been taken to
prise open the internal connection between nation and state, as well as to undermine the logical structure
of state governance. On the one hand, it is argued that nationhood no longer supplies the socio-cultural
glue political integration requires to operate with the unconditional assent of the people living in a given
territory.
39 On the other hand, the congruence between territoriality and functional competence
underlying (hierarchically ordered) state power is said to have broken down.
40 These developments7
therefore point to the new European polity being postnational in character and post-state in form. It is
within this new context that one needs to situate more general discussions about the end of sovereignty.
The nation state,  it is argued, no longer represents the fundamental political, legal and
administrative focus for the mediation of diffuse social interests. It does not control important decision-
making mechanisms; nor is it capable of expressing a common identity that can sustain a shared sense of
justice and the common good. In the face of this double crisis of sovereignty, there have been growing
demands for cosmopolitan and supra-national institutions and arrangements on which to base a pluralistic
understanding of global democracy and justice. The constitutional organisation of the European Union, it
is therefore argued, should reflect such arrangements. Although there may be some truth in such a
position, the implied death-knells for the nation-state and the idea of sovereignty are perhaps premature.
A brief analysis of the latter may help us to see why.
Simply put, sovereignty in a state is the capacity to control and direct its internal and external
affairs without depending on other powers (superiorem non recognoscens). However, it is a matter of
dispute whether sovereignty only admits of an ‘absolutist’ conception of politics, where power is
organised in such a way that there is always an ultimate and supreme authority. A more pluralist
conception of politics considers sovereignty as the relative superiority and independence of certain
powers and/or political formations within particular contexts, without necessarily establishing a monistic
and hierarchical system (with the sovereign at the apex), or a system of completely separate monads (of
fully sovereign states).
This more pluralist conception of sovereignty finds support in an analysis of the concept that
distinguishes between the internal/external meanings of sovereignty;
41 and its horizontal and vertical
dimensions. Historically, internal and external meanings of sovereignty have represented the two faces of
the formation of the modern state as viewed from within or without. Throughout this process, external
sovereignty (the power of acting autonomously with regard to both internal and external affairs) and
internal sovereignty (‘who’ has the authority to make decisions with regard to both internal and external
affairs) have normally tended to reinforce each other. But globalization, individualisation and
multiculturalism seem to have changed this traditional symmetry, expressed in the unity of the nation-
state, by problematizing the simple relation between space for action (external sovereignty) and capacity
of action (internal sovereignty). This has important consequences not only for the nation state as the sole
locus of legitimate sovereignty, but also for the idea of sovereignty in general, as the capacity of any
political unit to exercise self-determination.
The distinction between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of sovereignty comes in here.
Sovereignty can be apportioned both horizontally (in relation to competencies and decision-making
areas) and vertically (in relation to territorial units). The separation of powers and federalism
respectively provide the classic examples of each type of distribution. Within nation states these two
forms of distribution have been part of a hierarchical system. Sovereign power has been divided at the
centre, though usually with a mechanism for overcoming deadlock and forcing a decision, and devolved
down to lesser units. But as the relations of external and internal sovereignty become more complex, this
hierarchical picture breaks down. Instead, we need to reconceptualise sovereign power as being
horizontally and vertically dispersed between different bodies. In our view, this offers the most promising
account of the hitherto ill-defined concept of subsidiarity.
Within the EU, hierarchical, external sovereignty have been gradually acquired with little direct
involvement of the peoples of Europe in whose name and over whom it is exercised. In consequence, a
gap has opened up between legal and legitimate forms of political authority, internal and external
sovereignty, with the EU’s hierarchical claims being challenged by relatively autonomous vertical and
horizontal sources of power. Moreover, these latter sources often possess greater internal sovereignty
through being located in nationally or regionally controlled bodies with which people identify more.
Unsurprisingly, the question of political identity and the lack of a European ‘Demos’ has become crucial
to the issue of a future European polity. The appropriate response turns on whether  the EU’s aim is taken
to be the creation of a European people or merely the establishment of a closer Union amongst the8
European peoples. If the former, then the removal of Europe’s constitutional and federal deficits will
occur through increasing the people’s role within centralised European institutions. In this scenario, the
EU simply becomes a supranational federal state, that can claim a union of internal and external
sovereign power that can be hierarchically distributed. Yet that solution assumes a European Demos to
be in place. The same holds true even if we assert, as some theorists have done, that the constitution itself
is sovereign. For a general consensus on the legitimacy of liberal democratic arrangements and principles
does not amount to an agreement that it is legitimate for us to be governed by any set of institutions that
embodies these values and practices. They are simply too indeterminate to give precise answers to what
we should do any given situation. Deciding the right balance between welfare and defence, say, or the
right to privacy and freedom of information, can only occur amongst a people who conceive of
themselves as sharing certain collective purposes and interests, and hence appropriately subject to
common institutions. However impeccable the credentials of the EU’s political regime, it will be
illegitimate if the particular form of the European polity within which it operates lacks legitimacy.
If the European reality, as most commentators now acknowledge, is a more complex picture of
multiple Demoi, then we shall need to create a European polity on the basis of a more pluralist
conception of sovereignty. From this pluralist perspective, the present constitutional structure can be
described as a mixed system. Nation states remain the dominant players, giving the EU many of the
features of a confederation.
42 However, they sit alongside the supra- and to some extent post-national
institutions of the Commission, Parliament, the European Court of Justice and now the European Central
Bank. Meanwhile, the EU has encouraged the growth of political groups of a sub and a transnational
kind. For example, there are now over 3000 interest groups and a 100 regional offices based in Brussels.
Many are directly involved in formulating policy via the process of comitology. Correspondingly new
levels of decision making have also emerged that vary according to the policy and groups involved.
However, this is not a hierarchical system. There is growing disagreement over core policies, with only
10 of the 15 being members of the EU’s putative defence arm, the Western European Union, 12 signing
up to the Schengen accords on free movement of peoples, and 11 joining the single currency. Even at the
centre there is a complicated mix between intergovernmental decision making, as in the Council of
Ministers; potentially transnational, as in the European Parliament; supranational, as in the Commission;
and post-national, as with the ECJ. Moreover, all these institutions have to compete and incorporate the
various levels of subnational -  regional, local, workplace and community - decision making. Yet there
exists no clear lines of demarcated jurisdiction or overarching authority to decide disputes between them.
The Democratic Deficit (strictu sensu)
The issue of polity legitimacy and the need to accommodate demands for group identity and self-
determination is clearly the focus of what we have called the constitutional and federal deficits. But this
is only one aspect of political legitimacy. Even with nation states, it would be wrong to assume that the
legitimacy of the polity guarantees the legitimacy of its governing structure or regime. In a mixed polity,
however, the legitimation offered by the regime plays an especially important role in determining the
legitimacy of the polity itself. In the modern world, democracy has come to be seen as the only legitimate
form of state. The resulting democratic imperative holds that the institutional organisation of government
(but not necessarily social governance) must reflect the main underlying principles of democracy.
Denunciations of the European democratic deficit come into their own here. There is little doubt that the
structure of European governance does not fully conform to any meaningful interpretation of the many
standard definitions of democracy. There is no political equality in the present system of European
representation. Small countries, for instance, are over-represented in both the Council, the Parliament and
the Commission. The institutions of direct representation, namely the European Parliament, have no great
power; the little they have is mainly as a break upon other institutions, which are in full control of both
the political agenda and legislative promotion. No clear majoritarian rule operates in European decision
making; or, when it does, it involves a majority of the member states rather than their citizens. Finally,
none of the main European institutions fully satisfies what are usually considered as the important9
democratic principles of popular responsiveness and accountability; nor is much of the business of
government subject to the normative publicity associated with transparent decision making and freedom
of information.
If the European political regime must reflect the democratic imperative to be legitimate, then
there are a great many democratic deficits to be overcome. Yet why and how should the democratic
imperative apply, given the new conditions in which the European polity and its component nation states
now operate? The very principles of democracy may need revision to meet postnational and global
conditions, much as they did in taking on their modern representative form during this century as a result
of democracy’s extension to the masses and its application at a national scale. Addressing the European
democratic deficit is not as simple as it appears. It involves both an understanding of what democracy is
and what it can actually do for the legitimation of government.
The two problems just outlined, what democracy is and how it contributes to political legitimacy,
are evident in the current literature on the democratic deficit, though not always distinguished with
precision. A democratic deficit has been taken to mean either a lack of democratic institutions and
procedures with European institutions, or a deficit of democratic legitimation for the very existence of
the EU. For some commentators, the latter issue seems to be the only relevant one. For the importance of
democracy as a legitimating principle makes its application imperative across the institutional spectrum.
So Pogge,
43 for instance, sees the compelling necessity to remedy democractic deficits in both first-order
decision making, when policy issues are decided, and second-order decision making, when the
constitutional rules are set up. He suggests, however, that democratic legitimacy fails to solve the
problem of how to set up second-order political decision making procedures, to which, instead experts
may be able to offer some answers according to more general principles of justice.
Albert Weale, for his part has focused on both aspects of the democratic deficit. In one of his
works, he considers three aspects of the democratic deficit in Europe, corresponding to the three
dimensions of political authority: locus, scope and decision-rules. Political authority implies the
definition of the bodies entitled to exercise it (locus); of the substantive area of decision making over
which political authority can be legitimately exercised (scope); and of the kind of rules most appropriate
to take authoritative decisions.
44 The EU fails the democratic test at all three levels of political authority,
but, as Weale himself recognises, this does not say much about the role of democracy in addressing
issues of legitimacy.
45  Noting that the neo-functionalist type of legitimacy, focused on the benefits of
European co-operation, is now insufficient, he advocates giving the EU a ‘democratic baptism’ through
constitutional conventions and referenda, along the lines employed to ratify the US constitution in the
name of ‘we the people’ at the end of the eighteenth century. In his view, this form of legitimacy appeals
to the principles of constitutional democracy (as formulated, for instance, in Rawls’s political liberalism).
Like Pogge, therefore, he sees a democratic solution to the deficit at the level of second-order decision-
making. However, he still sees problems for removing the democratic deficit with regard to first-order
decision-making due to the difficulty of applying the majoritarian principle in the supranational
conditions of the EU.
Weale’s caution stems from his awareness that majoritarian democracy (even when placed within
constitutional constraints) fails to address the question of political identity adequately.
46 Taking into
account the interplay between democratic institutions and political identity clearly involves the
recognition that there is a complex relationship between the two senses of the democratic deficit. A more
critical line has recently been taken on this point by Van Parjis and MaCormick,
47 who have both
suggested that ‘deficit’ is an undetermined concept: we need to know whether this is a maximal deficit or
an optimal deficit. The implication of this analysis is that there is no guarantee that by establishing
maximal democracy the legitimacy deficit will be addressed, nor that addressing the latter will
necessarily imply a recourse to democratic institutions and procedures.
As Neil MacCormick
48 has recently and convincingly argued, no regime is entirely democratic.
The European deficit of fully democratic institutions and procedures is not so unusual. The three main
branches of European governance form, in his view, a mix of bureaucratic-oligarchic elements, mainly10
embodied in the Commission (but one could also add the ECJ), with forms of direct (Parliament) and
indirect (Council) democratic control. This clearly makes for a mixed constitution, but, as he says, one
not wholly lacking in democratic elements or democratic spirit.
49 From this perspective, reform of the
European mixed regime
50 with regard both to its efficacy (in sustaining integration) and an increase in
direct forms of legitimation (which are required by the new intentionalist paradigm) is more a matter of
prudence, in designing and adapting institutions, than of acting on democratic imperatives.
51 As we have
argued elsewhere, the constitution of Europe should be seen as reflexive bricolage rather than grand
architecture.
52
The fact that democracy in its abstract sense may not be enough to guarantee the political
legitimacy of the regime is no argument against it or the democratisation of  European institutions.
However, any attempt to tackle the democratic deficit needs to take seriously the new demands that
globalization and multiculturalism pose to democracy in the 21st century. A European democracy has to
confront the issue of political identity by finding institutional means through which to parcel out
democratic power in ways that are consistent with a pluralist understanding of sovereignty.
53 This is a
particularly complex task, because regime legitimacy meshes with the legitimacy of the polity at this
point. As we saw, the mixing and overlapping of sovereignties (multiple Demoi and multi-level
governance) make Europe a mixed polity. Yet it is also a mixed regime (or commonwealth), in that there
is a mixing of different elements of rule (in the classical sense of the three forms of government). As
things stand, these cannot be considered transient features of the European Union. For its political
legitimacy depends on the mixture of elements making up the EU being given democratic recognition and
expression through a careful and sensitive allocation of powers and the design of inclusive institutions. A
mixed polity requires a mixed regime.
By posing the democracy question in this way, we suggest that democracy should be seen as
performing different functions in the formation, government and legitimation of a complex and
supranational polity such as the EU. We also suggest that a more reflective way of considering the nature
and role of democracy in such a polity is needed. This may also imply a different conception of what
kind of political principles are needed in a modern complex society.
Conclusion: A Political Constitutionalism
The normative turn in the study of Europe is not simply a matter of applying political norms fashioned
within the context of the nation state and applying them to the EU. Rather, it leads to a refashioning of
those norms. From this perspective, the gravest deficit confronting the EU lies in the imagination. Friends
and foes of the EU tend to measure it by the criteria of constitutional liberal democracy. A form of
government that developed alongside the nation state, it assumes a substantive consensus on the
constitutional principles framing a majoritarian or consensual form democracy, and a sense of collective
identity and common purposes amongst those to whom both the constitution and the democratic decision-
making procedures apply. The more contested principles, purposes and procedures become, the less
satisfactory this set up will be. As we have seen, this situation prevails in the EU. Within a complex
polity possessing multi-Demoi, we need a more political constitutionalism that fosters fair negotiation
and mutual accommodation amongst its members.
This approach can be better accommodated within a pre-liberal, neo-Republican conception of
constitutionalism, which identifies the constitution with the social composition and the form of
government of the polity, may offer better insights for addressing those problems. Much as we associate
a person’s physical health with his or her bodily constitution and regard a healthy individual as someone
with a balanced diet and regimen, so a healthy body politic was attributed to a political system capable of
bringing its various constituent groups into some sort of equilibrium with each other. The overall aim
was to disperse power so as to encourage a process of controlled political conflict and debate that
ensured the various groups and social classes both checked and ultimately co-operated with each other,
moving them thereby to construct and pursue the public good rather than narrow sectional interests.11
The politicised account of justice and social cohesion emerging from political constitutionalism
suits a concern with domination and the fact of social and cultural pluralism. A modus vivendi built
solely around a fair balance of power will not of itself produce mutual accommodation, however. It may
lead to stalemate and remains compatible with majority tyranny if a given group is sufficiently large
legitimately to arrogate the lions share of power to itself. The search for accommodation suggests that the
quality of decision making must be different. Negotiation and mutual accommodation between
differences involve a shift from a politics of interests to one based on reasons and arguments. Whilst
dispersing power aids the development of such attitudes, something more positive is needed actively to
encourage their adoption. None of this suggests agreement in a more substantive sense. Indeed at times it
may be possible to do no more than agree to disagree, and accept the authority of the democratic
procedure itself. In these cases the majority principle acts as a means for resolving conflict in an
authoritative manner when a compromise on substance cannot be achieved. Authority here rests on
neither claims to superior reason nor coercion but the simple acceptance of the procedure as authoritative
(in the sense of being ‘in’ authority) for the disputing parties. Here the authority of law rests on the
legitimacy of the political system which generates it. Parties acknowledge that in some cases there may
not be any ‘correct’ or ‘most just’ way of resolving a clash between incommensurable plural values, but
that the ways of ending the dispute are acceptable. The procedural fairness of the process of justice can
be more important than the preferability or consensus about the outcome.
A more political constitutionalism does not turn on the existence of a homogeneous community,
therefore, as certain communitarian theorists maintain. The political system can operate as a public good
for a plurality of social groups, without assuming they share other values (indeed, perhaps for the very
reason that they do not). Secession or conscientious objection may still have to be options for groups or
individuals whose values and convictions prove totally incompatible with those of the majority. Their
reasons could not be, however, claims to superiority - that their values and interests are worth more than
those of others. Rather, the case must be that such drastic measures are necessary to ensure equal worth
and that otherwise their cultures and concerns might be totally eroded. Even in these cases alternative
solutions, such as greater autonomy or special rights, might be available to keep them within the polity.
It is through the development of the mechanisms of identification, participation and
representation offered by political constitutionalism that collective and democratic self-determination
(the capacity, that is, of embodying popular sovereignty at large) in global and multicultural societies
becomes feasible yet again. The institutions of a political constitution have to be adapted to particular
circumstances. An ideal political system cannot be devised a priori because the range of dispositions,
traditions and social composition of a polity are highly variable factors. Existing systems, however, can
be evaluated for their capacity to realise the goals of a political constitutionalism. The EU still awaits its
Madison, the last proponent of this approach capable of combining normative and practical
considerations in equal measure. However, a Publius needs an audience and a context that only
normative debate about the EU is likely to create.12
Notes
                                                          
1 Research for this paper was supported by an ESRC Research Grant on ‘Sovereignty and Citizenship in a Mixed
Polity’ (R000222446). For helpful comments and stimulating and highly enjoyable discussions, we thank the
participants to the ESRC seminar series on ‘Legal Theory and the European Union’.
2 Cf. J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe. “Do the new clothes have an emperor” and other essays on
European integration (1999 Cambridge University Press), Ch 1.
3 Cf. Mitrany’s idea of ‘the relation of things’ as the core of functionalism: D. Mitrany, The Functional Theory of
Politics (1975 Martin Robertson), p. 37.
4 The list of works taking such a turn is growing rapidly. They are now too many to be listed without risking to leave
too many of them out.
5 We have developed similar arguments in R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, ‘Democracy, Sovereignty and the
constitution of the European Union: The Republican Alternative to Liberalism’, in The European Union and its
Order, (eds.) Zenon Bankowski and Andrew Scott (Blackwell, 2000).
6 Cf. P. Paul Taylor’s ‘Introduction’ to Mytrany, The Functional Theory, p. xii
7 Cf. amongst others, contributions to The European Union and its Order by Bankowski & Christodoulidis, Everson,
Walker, and  Wincott.
8 Cf. some of the contributions in K. A. Armstrong and J. Shaw, ‘Integrating Law’, (1998) Special Issue of Journal of
Common Market Studies, 36, 2.
9 G. Stoker, ‘Governance as Theory: Five propositions’, (1998) International Social Science Journal, 155, p. 19
10 For a discussion of the sociopolitical aspects of cosmopolitan globalist discourse, see R. Bellamy and D.
Castiglione, ‘Between cosmopolis and community: Three models of rights and democracy within the European
Union’, in Archibugi et al., Re-imagining Political Community (1998 Polity Press), pp. 152-78, at 154-57.
11 For a fuller discussion, cf. F. Snyder, General Course on Constitutional Law of the European Union, Collected
Courses of the Academy of European Law, (1998), VI, I, pp. 41-155.
12 Snyder, General Course, pp. 51-52.
13 Cf. A. Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations (1982 Macmillan),  p. 4.
14 These need not to be seen in a purely legalistic and formalistic sense. Snyder also refers to the material sense
(senso materiale) of the constitution. This is a concept particularly developed within the Italian constitutional
tradition capturing the fact that a constitution results from norms and practices not all of which have a formal
constitutional status, General Course, p. 53.
15 Snyder, General Course, p. 55
16 Snyder, General Course, ibid.
17 For the various meanings of legitimacy, cf. D. Beetham and C. Lord, Legitimacy and the EU (1998Longman),
passim.
18 Snyder, General Course, p. 55
19 ‘Grand’ is here meant with reference to the scope of the analysis, not necessarily to the underlying ambitions for
the reshaping of European society. So, those visions that support the status quo of an economic Europe, with strongly
entrenched national sovereignties can be defined ‘grand,’ even though they purport to resist any change in the current
structure of the EU. Such a view of Europe has been classified as that of a special-purpose association
(Zweckverband): cf. G. Winter, ‘Introduction’ to Reforming the sources and categories of EC legal acts, Report for
the General Secretariat of the European Consortium (March 1995), pp. 7-8; Snyder, General Course, p. 6; and R.
Bellamy and D. Castiglione, ‘Building the Union: The Nature of Sovereignty in the Political Architecture of Europe’
(1997), 16, Law and Philosophy, pp. 421-445.
20 Damiel Wincott in his contribution to The European Union and its Order laments the paucity of the academic
literature on the political projects themselves. We agree with him that this is yet another perspective from which to
study the European integration process, and that more work should be devoted to it; but, as we make clear below,
this is different from the new normative literature to which we refer.
21 To name but one text, cf. Q. Skinner, Meaning and Context, J. Tully (ed.) (1988 Polity Press).
22 Cf. also Snyder, General Course, p. 52.
23 For a distinction between an internal and an external perspective on the constitutional principles in Europe, cf.
Snyder, General Course, pp. 75-78.
24 An example of the open-endedness of political projects can be seen in the present (at the moment in which we
write) crisis of the Santer Commission. The events leading to it are open both to eurosceptic and europhile13
                                                                                                                                                                                          
intepretations. The former would emphasise the dangers of corruption in moving to a more integrated Europe; while
the latter would lie the blame at the door of the intergovernmental structure, which is unaccountable to the
representatives of the European people. Arguments can be presented in support of both views; but the effect that
such arguments will have on the crisis itself will depend on which of the political projects currently in formation will
carry the day.
25 Cf. D.N. Chryssochoou, ‘Metatheory and the Study of the European Union: Capturing the Normative Turn’ (1999
Mimeo, by kind concession of the Author).
26 On the process of integration so far and on its ethics, cf. R. Bellamy and A. Warleigh ‘From an ethics of
integration to an ethics of participation: Citizenship and the future of the European Union’, (1998) 27, Millennium:
Journal of International Studies, pp. 447-70.
27 Cf. Beetham and Lord, Legitmacy; and P. C. Schmitter, ‘If the nation state were to wither away in Europe, what
might replace it?’, in S. Gustavsson and L. Lewin (eds), The future of the nation-state: Essays on cultural pluralism
and political integration, (1996 Nerenius and Santérus), and  ‘Is it really possible to democratize the Euro-polity?’, in
A. Føllesdal and P. Koslowski (eds), Democracy and the European Union, (1998 Springer), pp. 13-36.
28 Cf. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, 1999, Ch. 7.
29 Cf. A. Moravcsik and K. Nicolaïdis, ‘Keynote Article: Federal Ideas and Constitutional Realities in the Treaty of
Amsterdam’, (1998) 36, Journal of Common Market Studies, Annual Review, pp. 13-38 .
30 Cf. J. Coppel and N. O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: taking rights seriously?’, (1992) 29, Common
Market Law Review, pp. 669-92; and B. De Witte, ‘Droit communitarie et valeurs constitutionelles nationales’,
(1991) 14, Droits, pp. 87-96.
31 Cf. D. Grimm, ‘Does Europe need a Constitution?’, (1995) 1, European Law Journal, pp. 282-302.
32 Cf. N. McCormick, ‘The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now’, (1995) 1, European Law Journal , pp. 255-62, and
MacCormick, N. ‘Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-sovereign state’, in R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione,
Constitutionalism in Transformation (1996 Blackwell), pp. 141-56; and P. Eleftheriadis, ‘Begging the Constitutional
Question’, (1998) 36, Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 255-72.
33 Cf. J. Shaw, Law of the European Union (1996, 2nd edition: Macmillan).
34 Cf. R. Bellamy, ‘The Constitution of Europe: Rights or Democracy?’, in R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi, D. Castiglione,
Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (1995 Lothian Foundation Press)
35 Cf. J. H. H. Weiler, ‘European Neo-Constitutionalism: In Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional
Order’. In Bellamy and Castiglione (eds), Constitutionalism in Transformation, pp. 105-21.
36 Cf. W. Streeck, ‘Neo-Voluntarism: A new European social policy regime?’, in Marks, et al., Governance in the
European Union (1996 Sage), pp. 64-94; Offe, ‘The democratic welfare state: A European regime under the strain of
European integration’ (1998 Mimeo, by kind concession of the Author).
37 Cf. P. C. Schmitter How to Democratize the Emerging Euro-polity: Citizenship, Representation, Decision-making,
(1996 Mimeo, by kind concession of the Author).
38 Cf. R. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, (1989 Yale University Press); A. Weale, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and the
Constitution of Europe’, in Bellamy et al. (eds.), Democracy and Constitutional Culture, pp. 81-94; ‘Majority rule,
political identity and European union’, in P. B. Lehning and A. Weale (eds), Citizenship, democracy and justice in
the new Europe (1997 Routledge), pp. 125-41; ‘Between representation and constitutionalism in the European
Union’, in A. Weale and M. Nentwich (eds), Political Theory and the European Union. Legitimacy, constitutional
choice and citizenship, (1998 Routledge), pp. 49-62.
39 Cf. D. Curtin, Postnational Democracy. The European Union in search of a political philosophy (1997 Kluwer
Law International); J. Habermas, Habermas, J. Between Facts and Norms  (1996 Polity Press).
40 Cf. Schmitter, ‘If The Nation State’ and How to Democratize.
41 The distinction here made between internal/external is the same of the one made by Deirdre Curtin in her
Postnational democracy, pp. 11-14. As argued below, this does not reproduce the simple distinction between internal
and external affairs, which is instead the kind of distinction adopted by Neil Walker in his contribution to this
collection. Both uses are legitimate, but their analytical import are clearly different.
42 M. Forsyth, ) Union of States – The Theory and Practice of Confederation, (1982 Leicester University Press); A.
Warleigh, ‘Better the devil you know? Synthetic and confederal understandings of European Unification’ (1998) 21,
West European Politics, pp. 1-18; D.N. Chryssochoou, ‘Democracy and symbiosis in the European Union: Towards
a confederal consociation?’ (1994) 17, West European Politics, pp. 95-128.
43 T. W. Pogge, ‘How to Create Supra-national Institutions Democratically. Some Reflections on the European
Union “Democratic Deficit”’, in Føllesdal and Koslowski (eds) Democracy and the European Union, pp. 160-85.14
                                                                                                                                                                                          
44 Weale, ‘Majority Rule’, pp. 128-31.
45 A. Weale ‘Single Market, European Integration and Political Legitimacy’. Paper presented at the ‘Evolution of
Rules for a Single European Market’, ESRC Conference, University of Exeter, 8-11 September 1994;and
‘Democratic Legitimacy’.
46 Weale, ‘Majority Rule’ and ‘Between representation’, passim.
47 P. Van Parijs, ‘Should the European Union become more democratic?’, in Føllesdal and Koslowski (eds),
Democracy and the European Union, pp. 287-301; and N. MacCormick, ‘Democracy, Subsidiarity, and Citizenship
in the “European Commonwealth”’ (1997) 16,  Law and Philosophy, pp. 331-56.
48 MacCormick, ‘Democracy, Subsidiarity’, at pp. 342-47.
49 MacCormick, ‘Democracy, Subsidiarity’, at p. 344.
50 Neil MacCormick calls it a mixed commonwealth. We also used mixed commonwealth in Bellamy and
Castiglione, ‘Building the Union’, following a suggestion from MacCormick himself; but, in fact, we there meant
what we now call mixed polity as opposed to mixed regime.
51 Also cf. Schmitter, How to Democratize; and P. Craig, ‘Democracy and Rule-making Within the EC: An
Empirical and Normative Assessment’, (1997) 3, European Law Journal, pp. 105-30, passim.
52 See Bellamy and Castiglione, ‘Building the Union ‘ and ‘The Normative Challenge of a European Polity:
Cosmopolitan and Communitarian Models Compared, Criticised and Combined’, in Føllesdal and Koslowski (eds),
Democracy and the European Union, pp. 254-84. Cf. also MacCormick, ‘Democracy, Subsidiarity’, pp. 354-56; and
Curtin, Postanational Democracy, pp. 61-62.
53 On this, see Cf. MacCormick’s discussion of subsidiarity in ‘Democracy, Subsidiarity’, pp. 350-54